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Empirical Article
Experimental research suggests that dysfunctional forms 
of cognitive processing help to cause and maintain 
 emotional disorders (Clark & Beck, 2010; Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997). Successful cognitive thera-
pies involve identifying and challenging these dysfunc-
tional cognitions. One example is biased attentional 
processing of emotional information, which is particularly 
implicated in the anxiety disorders (Yiend, 2010). 
Individuals with anxiety (clinically disordered and sub-
clinically anxious) typically prioritize processing of threat-
ening information in the visual environment in preference 
to benign or positive information (see Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van Ijzendoorn, 
2007, for meta-analysis of visual-spatial attentional “probe” 
tasks). This cognitive pattern is assumed to lead to exag-
gerated negative perceptions and evaluations, which 
helps maintain anxiety, establishing a vicious cycle of 
cause and effect (Mathews, 1990). Experimental findings 
to date have supported this view, demonstrating that 
attentional biases toward negative information are associ-
ated with clinical and subclinical anxiety using a range of 
stimuli including words, faces, and pictures (for reviews, 
see Bar-Haim et  al., 2007; Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; 
Yiend, 2010).
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Abstract
A well-established literature has identified different selective attentional orienting mechanisms underlying anxiety-
related attentional bias, such as engagement and disengagement of attention. These mechanisms are thought to 
contribute to the onset and maintenance of anxiety disorders. However, conclusions to date have relied heavily on 
experimental work from subclinical samples. We therefore investigated individuals with diagnosed generalized anxiety 
disorder (GAD), healthy volunteers, and individuals with high trait anxiety (but not meeting GAD diagnostic criteria). 
Across two experiments we found faster disengagement from negative (angry and fearful) faces in GAD groups, 
an effect opposite to that expected on the basis of the subclinical literature. Together these data challenge current 
assumptions that we can generalize, to those with GAD, the pattern of selective attentional orienting to threat found 
in subclinical groups. We suggest a decisive two-stage experiment identifying stimuli of primary salience in GAD, then 
using these to reexamine orienting mechanisms across groups.
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This fundamental research in experimental psychopa-
thology has emphasized that the direct targeting of dys-
functional biases in attention is an important strategy in 
the treatment of anxiety disorders. In particular, “atten-
tional training” (sometimes called attention bias modifi-
cation procedures or ABM) is aimed at reducing symptoms 
and behaviors associated with anxiety by systematically 
reducing negative attentional biases and training selec-
tive attention to orient away, or to disengage, from threat 
(Koster, Fox, & MacLeod, 2009; Woud & Becker, 2014). 
For example, in one study (Amir, Beard, Burns, & 
Bomyea, 2009), 14 patients with generalized anxiety dis-
order (GAD) were assigned to an active ABM procedure 
in which attention was systematically directed away from 
threat words, whereas 15 were assigned to a control 
training procedure in which attention was directed to 
threat-related and neutral stimuli equally often. Following 
eight sessions of training, there was a significant reduc-
tion in negative attention bias from pre- to post-ABM 
training in the active training group but not in the control 
group. Of importance, there was also a significant reduc-
tion in clinical symptoms in those who received the 
active training. It is remarkable that 50% of those who 
had received active training no longer met diagnostic cri-
teria for GAD following the eight sessions compared with 
just 13% of those who had received placebo training. 
These results suggest that negative attentional biases may 
indeed play a critical role in the maintenance of GAD 
symptoms. Although subsequent studies have generally 
produced much smaller effect sizes, two meta-analyses 
support the view that ABM procedures show promise as 
a novel treatment for a variety of anxiety disorders 
(Hakamata et al., 2010; Hallion & Ruscio, 2011).
What has emerged in the recent literature is that the 
ability to manipulate attention biases is somewhat incon-
sistent and effect sizes on clinical outcome measures are 
generally lower than expected. In a useful overview, it 
has been noted that when a negative attention bias is 
successfully modified, a congruent impact on emotional 
reactivity occurs (Clarke, Notebaert, & MacLeod, 2014). 
However, the majority of studies of ABM in clinical 
groups have failed to shift attentional biases (7 out of 
11), and therefore it is not surprising that the overall 
impact of ABM on clinical symptoms is inconsistent 
(Clarke et  al., 2014). Several investigators, have sug-
gested that there is now an urgent need to focus on 
maximizing the efficacy of bias modification procedures 
(Clarke et al., 2014; Fox, Mackintosh, & Holmes, 2014; 
Lester, Mathews, Davison, Burgess, & Yiend, 2011; Yiend, 
Lee, et  al., 2014; Yiend, Parnes, Shepherd, Roche, & 
Cooper, 2014). To optimize such interventions, it is, 
however, vital to have a clearer understanding of the 
nature of the mechanism of change in specific anxiety 
disorders such as GAD.
To improve our understanding of attentional bias 
mechanisms, the field has borrowed from mainstream 
attentional research. There, an important conceptual dis-
tinction is that between selective attention (selection) and 
attentional orienting (orienting; Yiend, 2010). Bias in 
selective attention refers to certain material (threat, in the 
case of GAD) being prioritized over other material for 
further processing and is typically measured by tradi-
tional attentional bias tasks, such as the so-called atten-
tional probe task. Attentional orienting, on the other 
hand, can be thought of as one possible mechanism by 
which attentional selection can be implemented. 
Orienting refers to the process of moving attention to a 
location, either in space (spatial orienting) or, less com-
monly, in time (temporal orienting).1 Orienting frequently 
uses Posner’s distinction among shifting, engagement, 
and disengagement of attention (Posner & Petersen, 
1990). A long-standing concept in attention research, it 
has been of particular interest recently within psychopa-
thology research as a means to further specify the cogni-
tive mechanisms by which attentional biases operate.
Although selective attentional bias favoring threat in 
GAD is well evidenced, research on the components of 
orienting (disengage, engage) that might underlie this 
effect have, to date, been largely restricted to subclinical 
samples. A growing literature in subclinical anxiety has 
suggested that there are different components of anxiety-
related attentional bias and that these may have different 
clinical implications. However, this has been assumed 
more often than tested in clinical populations. For exam-
ple, it has been shown that participants reporting high 
levels of trait anxiety take longer to disengage their atten-
tion from threat-related words and faces (Fox, Russo, 
Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002; 
Georgiou et  al., 2005), affective pictures (Yiend & 
Mathews, 2001), and locations associated with negative 
outcomes (Derryberry & Reed, 2002). This suggests that 
anxiety-related attentional biases may be associated with 
problems in disengaging attention from negative material 
as well as enhanced engagement with threat (Fox, 
Mathews, Calder, & Yiend, 2007; Mathews, Fox, Yiend, & 
Calder, 2003). Attentional orienting mechanisms have 
already been investigated in social phobia (Amir, Elias, 
Klumpp, & Przeworski, 2003), but this disorder can show 
attentional effects at odds with those of other anxiety 
disorders (Staugaard, 2010), therefore results may not be 
generalizable to GAD.
Obtaining relevant empirical evidence about atten-
tional orienting mechanisms underlying biased process-
ing of threat in GAD patients is important for various 
reasons. First, cognitive theories of emotional disorders, 
including GAD, propose cognitive biases (including 
attentional bias) to be key factors in the etiology and 
maintenance of the psychopathology (Mathews & 
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MacLeod, 2005). Biases are not seen as mere epiphenom-
ena of altered mood states, but rather are considered to 
play an important role in increasing the risk of disorder 
onset, maintenance, and, if left unresolved after treat-
ment, recurrence of a disorder. This position is supported 
by empirical evidence using longitudinal and manipula-
tion designs, supporting a bidirectional causal model 
(Van Bockstaele et al., 2014) as well as pharmacological 
studies (e.g. Murphy et al 2008). Second, it is important 
to identify the appropriate cognitive mechanisms to tar-
get in the treatment of GAD. Biases in different compo-
nents of attentional orienting could have different clinical 
implications. For instance, if individuals with clinical anx-
iety show speeded engagement toward threat, then 
detection and evaluation processes are implicated, sug-
gesting that therapists might focus on reducing patients’ 
sensitivity to threat. If disengaging from threat is impaired, 
this suggests patients might derive more benefit from 
improving their ability to disregard negative information. 
Third, elucidating the involvement of specific orienting 
mechanisms (engagement, disengagement, or both) in 
GAD should more broadly enhance the development of 
translational research, such as the ABM training tech-
niques described earlier. The primary aim of the present 
study was therefore to investigate the spatial attentional 
orienting mechanisms underlying threat-related selective 
attentional biases in GAD.
The data reported here derive from two separate 
experiments, both involving patients meeting diagnostic 
criteria for GAD. Both studies attempted to identify the 
specific components of attentional orienting underlying 
naturally occurring selective attentional bias to threat. 
Although it is likely that GAD is characterized primarily 
by attention biases that are specific to personal concerns 
and worries, there is evidence that GAD patients, relative 
to matched controls, show attentional biases involving 
more general threat, for example involving angry facial 
expressions (Ashwin et al., 2012; Bradley, Mogg, White, 
Groom, & de Bono, 1999). Therefore, to facilitate com-
parisons with previous studies in subclinical anxiety (Fox 
et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2007; Georgiou et al., 2005), we 
used emotional and neutral facial expressions in the cur-
rent investigations.
In the first of two experiments, we assessed the disen-
gagement of attention from angry, happy, and neutral 
facial expressions in GAD patients and matched healthy 
volunteers using a task that we have previously used with 
individuals with subclinical anxiety (Georgiou et  al., 
2005). We assessed angry, rather than fearful, facial 
expressions because previous studies of disengage pro-
cesses in trait anxiety (Fox et al., 2001) and biased atten-
tion in GAD (Ashwin et al., 2012; Bradley et al., 1999) 
have more typically used angry facial expressions. 
Experiment 1 also included a group of people reporting 
high levels of trait anxiety, but not meeting diagnostic 
criteria for GAD, for comparison with the previously 
reviewed findings in subclinical anxiety. GAD patients 
and high trait anxious groups were matched on self-
reported trait anxiety (although not on depression), but 
differed on clinical status. This design allowed us to more 
clearly determine whether the pattern of attentional bias 
apparent in GAD would be similar to that found previ-
ously in subclinical anxiety.
The attention task used in Experiment 1 assessed the 
spatial orienting components of anxiety-related bias. The 
task involved the presentation of a face at the center of a 
computer screen for over half a second followed by a 
target letter that was flashed on the screen very briefly 
(50 ms) above, below, to the left, or to the right of the 
centrally located face. In a previous study with this task 
we reported that a subclinical group with high trait anxi-
ety took longer to categorize the peripheral target letter 
when it was presented with a fearful face relative to 
when the centrally located face conveyed happiness, sad-
ness, or a neutral expression (Georgiou et  al., 2005), 
implying that high trait anxiety is linked with a delay in 
disengaging from fear-related material. In Experiment 1 
the aim was to assess whether the GAD group would 
show a delay in disengaging from threatening (i.e., angry) 
facial expressions as was expected in the high trait anx-
ious (subclinical) group. A delay was not expected in the 
matched control group.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. A total of 14 GAD patients, 14 of their 
relatives (matched healthy volunteers), and 14 people 
with high levels of self-reported trait anxiety who did not 
pass criteria for GAD took part in the study. Patients were 
identified through clinician referrals for the North East 
Essex Mental Health Trust, and most were on a waiting 
list for an appointment with a clinical psychologist at the 
trust. Initial telephone screening was conducted using 
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM–IV (SCID; First, 
Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1996) by a researcher trained 
in clinical interviewing and the use of the SCID by an 
approved local trainer (M.L.). All patients were given the 
anxiety disorders modules, and additional relevant mod-
ules were completed as necessary. Inclusion criteria were 
likely diagnosis of GAD on the SCID, aged between 18 
and 65 years, and native English speaking. Exclusion cri-
teria (checked by telephone screening or at interview) 
were significant psychiatric comorbidity, addictions, or 
current major physical illness. Those in current receipt of 
psychological or pharmacological treatment were also 
excluded. Upon agreeing in principle to take part in the 
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study, patients were asked to nominate a close relative 
who could also take part in the study as a matched 
healthy volunteer. A further group of 14 people who had 
reported high levels of trait anxiety (more than 45 on the 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory trait anxiety scale) were 
also included in the study. These were recruited from the 
University of Essex campus and had responded to adver-
tisements to partake in psychological studies. All healthy 
volunteers and high trait anxious participants were given 
a short form of the SCID either via telephone screening 
or at interview and were excluded if they reported any 
previous or current major psychopathology, major physi-
cal illness, or addictions.
Materials
Trait and state anxiety. The State-Trait Anxiety Inven-
tory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & 
Jacobs, 1983) is a well-validated self-report question-
naire. The trait anxiety form of the STAI consists of 20 
items developed to measure the degree of dispositional 
trait anxiety. Participants score each item on a 4-point 
Likert-type scale, and the total score ranges from 20 (very 
low trait anxiety) to 80 (very high trait anxiety), with the 
population median being around 40. The state anxiety 
form of the STAI is similar but measures “how you feel 
now.”
Depression. The Beck Depression Inventory–II (BDI-
II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) is a well-validated 21-item 
questionnaire that provides a measure of depression 
severity. Participants score each item on a 4-point Likert-
type scale, and total scores of 0 to 13 are considered to be 
within the minimal range, scores of 14 to 19 reflect mild 
depression, scores of 20 to 28 reflect moderate depres-
sion, and scores from 29 to 63 are considered severe.
Mill Hill Vocabulary Scale. The Mill Hill Vocabulary 
Scale (MHVS; Raven, Court, & Raven, 1986) assesses ver-
bal intelligence and consists of two lists of words divided 
into two sets (A and B) of 34 words, arranged in order of 
ascending difficulty, which those taking the test are asked 
to define. We used the multiple-choice version from Set 
B. Participants were asked to select the correct synonym 
from a list of six alternatives, and the maximum score 
was 33.
Attentional task. For this reaction time task, three 
different photographs were selected from the Ekman 
and Friesen (1975) set of emotional facial expressions. 
All were of the same individual but displayed different 
expressions: anger, happiness, and neutral. All photo-
graphs were presented in black and white, were matched 
for brightness, and measured 6.8 cm × 10.3 cm in size. 
In an earlier pilot study, 12 undergraduate students had 
rated the faces (among several other faces) in terms of 
whether they appeared to be “happy,” “sad,” “fearful,” 
“angry,” “surprised,” “disgusted,” or “neutral.” It was found 
that 100% categorized the angry face as “angry,” 100% 
categorized the happy face as “happy,” and 83.3% cat-
egorized the neutral face as “neutral,” whereas 16.7% cat-
egorized this face as “sad.” The target letters were P and 
X and were presented in Geneva size 24 font. They were 
presented 8 cm above, below, to the left, or to the right 
of the centrally presented face. At a viewing distance of 
60 cm, this was 7.6 degrees of visual angle from the face 
stimulus.
Procedure. Testing took place either in a quiet room at 
the North East Essex Mental Health Trust in Clacton or at 
the University of Essex in Colchester. After consent pro-
cedures, participants completed the STAI–trait, BDI-II, 
and STAI–state forms, followed by the MHVS. Participants 
were shown the computer and button box, and the atten-
tional task was explained in detail. It was explained that 
they would see an asterisk at the center of the screen and 
that they should keep their eyes focused on this location. 
It was explained that a face would shortly appear in this 
location followed by a letter (either X or P) above, below, 
to the left, or to the right of the face. They were instructed 
to keep their eyes on the face, but categorize the letter as 
quickly and accurately as possible by pressing either the 
red or the green button on the response box. Response 
mappings were counterbalanced across participants so 
that half pressed the red button for X whereas half 
pressed the green button for X and vice versa. Every trial 
began with an asterisk at the center of the computer 
screen for 1,000 ms. One of the three facial expressions 
was then presented, and after 600 ms one of the target 
letters was presented in one of the four locations for 50 
ms. The face remained on the screen until the participant 
responded or, if there was no response, after 2,000 ms. 
There was a blank screen for 500 ms, and then the next 
trial began.
All participants completed a practice block of 28 trials, 
and once they were happy with the procedure they started 
the main experiment. This consisted of 288 trials, which 
were divided equally into trials with targets above (72), 
below (72), to the left (72), or to the right (72) of the face. 
For each location, the centrally presented face was equally 
often angry (96), happy (96), or neutral (96). Likewise, the 
actual target letter (X or P) appeared equally often with 
each facial expression and in each location. Each partici-
pant received a different randomized order of trials.
All stimuli were presented on a Power Macintosh 
7200/90 computer with a 29 cm × 21 cm Sony Trinitron 
Multiscan screen. Presentation of stimuli and data collec-
tion was controlled by PsyScope software (Cohen, 
MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993), and reaction times 
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were recorded on a USB-based RB-834 response pad 
with a built-in timer that allowed data to be collected 
with a 1-ms accuracy.
Results
Participant characteristics. Characteristics of the 
participants in the three separate groups are shown in 
Table 1. A series of one-way ANOVAs showed that there 
were differences across the three groups on age, F(2, 
39)  = 9.10, p < .01, η2p = .32; trait anxiety, F(2, 39) = 
75.58, p < .01; BDI-II, F(2, 39) = 33.81, p < .01, η2p = .80; 
and state anxiety, F(2, 39) = 32.00, p < .01, η2p = .62. As 
expected the GAD and control groups were matched on 
age and MHVS scores, Fs < 1, η2p < .02, whereas the GAD 
group reported higher levels of trait and state anxiety and 
depression on the BDI-II, Fs > 29.91, ps < .01, η2p > .53. 
The GAD and high trait anxiety groups were matched on 
trait and state anxiety, Fs < 1, η2p < .04, whereas the GAD 
group reported higher levels of depression on the BDI-II, 
F(1, 26) = 4.53, p < .05, η2p = .15. The high trait anxiety 
group also reported higher levels of trait anxiety, state 
anxiety, and depression on the BDI-II in comparison 
with the control group, Fs > 94.69, ps < .01, η2p > .78. 
Finally, the high trait anxiety group was significantly 
younger than both the GAD and control groups, Fs > 
11.95, ps < .01, η2p > .78.
Attentional task. Reaction time data were prepared by 
removing trials on which errors occurred and eliminating 
high and low outliers (high outliers > 1500 ms, low outli-
ers < 200 ms). In total, 3.5% of the data were excluded on 
this basis (errors were made on 2.4% of trials, and outli-
ers represented 1.1% of trials).2 Mean reaction times by 
condition are shown in Figure 1. Data were analyzed by 
means of a 3 × 3 ANOVA, with factors Group (GAD, con-
trol, high trait anxiety) × Valence of Face (angry, happy, 
neutral). There were no main effects for either Group, 
F(2, 39) = 1.99, η2p = .09 or Valence of Face, F < 1, η2p = 
.02, whereas the Group × Valence of Face interaction did 
reach statistical significance, F(4, 78) = 3.56, MSE = 
1828.83, p < .01, η2p = .16. Follow-up one-way ANOVAs 
Table 1. Participant Characteristics for Experiments 1 and 2
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
Characteristic GAD (n = 14) Controls (n = 14) HTA (n = 14) GAD (n = 21) Controls (n = 21)
Age 43.1 (7.1)a 45.0 (8.6)a 32.8 (8.6)b 40.48a 38.62a
STAI–State 53.8 (12.5)a 33.3 (6.4)b 57.2 (4.8)a 42.58a 32.67b
STAI–Trait 63.0 (8.7)a 36.4 (5.3)b 61.4 (4.3)a 57.76a 35.19b
BDI-II 23.5 (8.2)a 7.4 (1.7)b 18.4 (3.9)a 19.52a 3.76b
HADS–Anxiety 12.71a 4.10b
HADS–Depression 8.71a 1.62b
LSAS–Fear or Anxiety 29.79a 13.24b
LSAS–Avoidance 26.29a 11.48b
MHVS 18.9 (3.4)a 19.4 (3.0)a  
GHQ 20.05a 9.90b
Note: BDI-II = Beck Depression Inventory–II; GAD = generalized anxiety disorder; GHQ = General Health Questionnaire; HADS = Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale; HTA = high trait anxiety; LSAS = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. Within each 
experiment, superscript letters that are the same indicate no differences between the groups, whereas different superscript letters indicate that the 
groups differed significantly. Values in parentheses are standard deviations.
500
520
540
560
580
600
620
640
660
680
700
GAD
Angry Happy Neutral
High TraitControl
Fig. 1. Mean reaction times (in milliseconds) for responses to periph-
eral target letters when centrally located faces conveyed an angry, 
happy, or neutral expression for individuals with generalized anxiety 
disorder (GAD), matched controls (Control), or those with high trait 
anxiety (High Trait).
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were conducted on each Group separately for Valence of 
Face. For the GAD group, the main effect of Valence of 
Face was significant, F(2, 26) = 5.68, MSE = 1404.72, p < 
.01, η2p = .31. Further analysis using paired contrasts 
showed that reaction times for this group were faster 
when the central face was angry compared with neutral, 
F(1, 13) = 9.35, p < .01, η2p = .42. Reaction times for angry 
relative to happy face trials did not reach statistical sig-
nificance, F(1, 13) = 4.03, p < .07, η2p = .24, and neither 
did those of happy compared with neutral face trials, 
F(1,13) = 1.65, η2p = .11. The main effect of Valence of 
Face did not reach significance for either the matched 
control group, F(2, 26) = 1.49, MSE = 1499.52, η2p = .10, 
p = .24, or the high trait anxious group, F(2, 26) = 1.72, 
MSE = 2582.33, η2p = .12, p = .20. Table 2 shows the rel-
evant means and standard deviations for each group as a 
function of condition.
Discussion
The findings of Experiment 1 imply that the pattern of 
impaired disengagement from threatening expressions, 
previously reported in high trait anxious subclinical sam-
ples, may not be directly generalizable to clinical anxiety. 
Although we did not replicate previous findings of 
impaired disengagement in individuals with subclinical 
high trait anxiety in the current study (Fox et  al., 2001; 
Georgiou et al., 2005), we did find significant differences 
in the GAD group, in a direction opposite to that expected. 
Individuals with GAD were faster to respond to a periph-
eral target letter when a centrally presented face was angry 
relative to happy or neutral, a pattern not found in matched 
healthy volunteers. One explanation for these results is 
that GAD patients showed attentional avoidance of threat-
ening facial expressions. Thus, rather than impaired disen-
gagement of attention as expected, this patient sample 
appeared to show enhanced disengagement.
One problem with the task employed in Experiment 1 
was that it is difficult to separate any effects of general 
interference from those specifically related to selective 
attention and attentional orienting. For instance, it is pos-
sible that patients were faster to respond on threat trials 
due to a generally increased arousal level in the presence 
of threat. Although randomly interspersing emotional 
and neutral trials might help protect against this, it 
remains possible that momentary fluctuations in physio-
logical response to threat could account for a similar pat-
tern of reaction times to that which we seek to attribute 
to attentional effects. We addressed this concern in 
Experiment 2 by using a methodology that provides a 
separate measure of general arousal, allowing us to more 
precisely isolate selective attentional effects. The para-
digm chosen was the emotional adaptation of the so-
called Posner peripheral cuing task (Fox et  al., 2001; 
Yiend & Mathews, 2001). This task involves using emo-
tional cues (here facial expressions) presented in the 
periphery of the visual field that capture attention at their 
location. The speed of identifying an arbitrary probe 
(such as a letter) at either the same or a different location 
from the cue acts as an indicator of the spatial orienting 
of attention and how orienting speed may vary according 
to the type of emotion depicted in the cue. On invalid 
trials attention must be disengaged from an emotional 
cue appearing in the periphery to detect a target occur-
ring in a different location. By changing the emotion of 
the cue it is therefore possible to compare ease of disen-
gaging attention from different types of emotional 
information.
Further limitations of Experiment 1 concerned the 
small sample size and the restricted range of facial 
expressions of emotion used in the study. With only 14 
participants per group, power to detect small effects was 
low, and the possibility of false positives relatively high. 
Experiment 2 was therefore based on an a priori power 
Table 2. Mean Reaction Times per Condition in Experiments 1 and 2
Experiment 1 Experiment 2
 
Angry Happy Neutral
Peripheral Cuing Task
 Angry Fear Happy Neutral
GAD 653.3 (152.9) 687.6 (165.8) 699.3 156.6)  
Healthy 596.5 (129.7 608.0 (124.4) 621.9 (136.0) Invalid 656.63 (15.5) 654.50 (15.1) 660.44 (16.7) 668.47 (15.2)
High trait anxious 597.3 (126.9) 569.7 (150.7) 563.9 (148.7) Valid 608.78 (15.2) 616.14 (15.1) 608.71 (14.6) 600.14 (14.7)
 Central Cuing Task
 Fear Neutral
 700 ms 562.32 (13.8) 555.05 (14.0)
 300 ms 571.13 (13.7) 573.50 (13.3)
Note: Values are milliseconds, with standard errors in parentheses. GAD = generalized anxiety disorder.
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calculation and tested groups of 21 GAD and 21 matched 
healthy volunteers. We also included a more comprehen-
sive selection of facial expressions: fearful, angry, happy, 
and neutral.
Finally, Experiment 2 added a second task, an adapta-
tion of a gaze direction cuing task, which has been used 
to assess the engagement component of spatial atten-
tional orienting. Observing another person looking in a 
particular direction (eye gaze) has the effect of directing 
and engaging the observer’s attention to that same loca-
tion (Driver et al., 1999; Langton & Bruce, 1999). Facial 
expression of emotion can therefore be used in combina-
tion with eye gaze to assess the effects of different emo-
tional expressions on attentional engagement to a 
location cued by the direction of the gaze. On so-called 
congruent trials, if an emotional facial expression facili-
tates engagement to the location indicated by the averted 
eyes, that should lead to particularly fast (efficient) target 
identification compared with similar trials using neutral 
expressions with averted eye gaze. We have used this 
task in two previous studies with subclinical anxiety and 
found that those who reported high trait anxiety did 
show enhanced orienting toward a location (i.e., engage-
ment) indicated by the eye gaze of a fearful facial expres-
sion relative to a neutral expression (Fox et  al., 2007; 
Mathews et al., 2003). Of interest, on centrally cued trials 
in which the eye gaze does not move (very similar to the 
task used in Experiment 1 here), fearful expressions did 
not hold attention any more than neutral faces (Fox et al., 
2007; Mathews et al., 2003), but angry facial expressions 
did hold the attention of high trait anxious participants to 
a disproportionate extent (Fox et al., 2007), indicating a 
difficulty in disengaging from angry facial expressions. 
We used just fearful and neutral expressions in the cur-
rent investigation to determine whether a similar pattern 
of attentional orienting occurs in a group of patients 
diagnosed with GAD as we have observed in those 
reporting high levels of trait anxiety (Mathews et  al., 
2003). Once again, this is important to establish whether 
results found with subclinically anxious groups can be 
generalized to clinical groups.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Using 21 participants in each group this 
study had 80% power to detect a small effect size (f = 
0.1) on the Trial Type (2) × Cue Type (2) within–between 
interaction, assuming six levels of repeated measure-
ment (Erdfelder, Faul, & Buchner, 1996). A small effect 
on the task would equate to a difference of 20 ms on 
reaction times of around 500 ms, with a standard devia-
tion of 100 ms.
A total of 21 GAD patients and 21 healthy volunteers 
participated in the study. Patients were identified through 
clinician referrals from Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire 
Mental Healthcare Trust staff. These included consultant 
psychiatrists, psychologists, primary care counselors, 
and patient response to poster advertisements in a local 
psychiatric outpatient department. Initial telephone 
screening using the GAD-Q (Roemer, Borkovec, Posa, & 
Borkovec, 1995) was used to confirm likely GAD diag-
nosis. Exclusion criteria (checked by telephone screen-
ing or at interview) were significant psychiatric 
comorbidity, in current receipt of psychological or phar-
macological treatment, current major physical illness, 
current addictions, and past serious head injury. Patients 
were not excluded if they had previously received an 
intervention for GAD but remained symptomatic at diag-
nostic level.
Healthy volunteers were recruited by responses to 
poster advertisement on local public notice boards, 
Internet advertisements, and local media publications. 
Exclusion criteria for healthy volunteers were checked 
during telephone screening and included past or present 
psychopathology as indicated by self-report, current 
major physical illness, current addictions, and past seri-
ous head injury. Inclusion criteria (in both groups) were 
age (18–65) and native English speaking. Despite screen-
ing procedures, 4 control participants reported levels of 
trait anxiety within the clinical range (50 or above on the 
STAI–trait; Spielberger et  al., 1983). These participants 
were therefore ineligible to be included in the healthy 
control group and were replaced. This decision was 
made on a priori grounds, before any data analysis had 
been conducted, on the basis that all participants must 
meet the inclusion criteria for the relevant group to take 
part in the study. All participants had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision.
Materials. All stimuli for the experimental tasks were 
taken from standardized sets. For the peripheral cuing 
task, Caucasian stimuli were selected from the JACFEE/
JACNeuF sets of facial expressions (Matsumoto & 
Ekman, 1988). Eight identities of each emotion (happy, 
neutral, angry, and fearful) were chosen based on the 
normative data provided, each being presented a total 
of 12 times during the task. For the central cuing task, 
stimuli were those used previously by Mathews et  al. 
(2003). Eight identities of each emotion (neutral and 
fearful) were used from the Ekman series on the basis 
of the normative ratings provided (Ekman & Friesen, 
1976). Each identity had previously been digitally 
manipulated to produce eye gaze shift (left and right) 
for use on relevant trials. Stimuli were assigned to trial 
condition within each type of emotion according to a 
fixed random order.
 by Jenny Yiend on October 26, 2015cpx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Selective Attention 765
Procedure. After completing consent procedures, 
healthy volunteers were asked to complete the General 
Health Questionnaire (Goldberg & Williams, 1988). 
Patients were given the SCID (First et  al., 1996) by a 
researcher experienced in clinical interviewing and spe-
cifically trained in its use by an approved local trainer. All 
patients were given the anxiety disorders modules, and 
the SCID screen was used to identify additional relevant 
modules that were completed as necessary. Participants 
then received the following two computerized experi-
mental tasks in counterbalanced order.
Peripheral cuing task. This task used the method 
employed by Yiend and Mathews (2001) and Fox et al. 
(2001) to compare attentional disengagement from faces 
of different emotional expressions. Participants fixated a 
central cross while a face cue appeared either on the left 
or right. Their task was to identify a subsequent target 
letter (E or F) as quickly as possible but without making 
errors. Targets either appeared opposite (an invalid trial) 
or in the same location (a valid trial) as the face cue. A 
total of 384 trials were presented, using a valid to invalid 
ratio of 2 to 1. Cues were presented for either 200 ms or 
500 ms, and four different emotional facial expressions 
were used as cues: happy, angry, fearful, and neutral. 
The factors Cue Duration (2), Facial Expression (4), and 
Validity (2: valid, invalid) were used in a fully crossed 
design with 16 trials in each invalid condition and 32 in 
each valid condition. Trials were presented in a random-
ized order generated automatically by the computer soft-
ware with optional rest breaks. The task lasted around 
20 minutes.
Central cuing task. This task used the method 
employed previously by Mathews et  al. (2003). Par-
ticipants fixated a central cross, after which a face cue 
appeared in the center, replacing fixation. The eyes then 
shifted to the left or right, cueing attention to that loca-
tion. The task was to identify a subsequent target letter 
(E or F) appearing in either the cued (congruent trials) 
or uncued (incongruent trials) location as quickly as pos-
sible but without making errors. A total of 384 trials were 
presented, using a congruent to incongruent ratio of 1 to 
1. Cues were presented for two durations, 300 ms or 700 
ms, and depicted either fearful or neutral facial expres-
sions. The factors Cue Duration (2), Facial Expression 
(2), and Congruency (3: valid, invalid, central—eyes do 
not move) were used in a fully crossed design with 32 tri-
als per condition, presented in a randomized order. The 
task lasted around 20 minutes, with optional rest breaks.
At the end of the experimental tasks all participants 
completed the following questionnaire measures in an 
individually allocated random order: the BDI (Beck, 
Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961), the Liebowitz 
Social Anxiety Scale (Liebowitz, 1987), the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983), 
and the state and trait versions of the STAI (Spielberger 
et al., 1983).
Results
Participants. Table 1 shows participant characteristics. 
Patients and healthy volunteers differed significantly on 
all measures of mood state, trait, and symptoms, but not 
on age.
Peripheral cueing task. Error trials totaled 2.9% of the 
data and outliers 0.8% (high outliers > 1,370 ms; low outli-
ers < 200 ms).3 Mean reaction times to identify the target 
in the peripheral cuing task were subjected to a mixed 
model ANOVA with one between-subjects factor, Group 
(patient, control), and three within-subjects factors, Cue 
Duration (200, 500 ms), Facial Expression (anger, fear, 
happy, neutral), and Validity (invalid, valid). There was a 
main effect of Validity, F(1, 40) = 30.67, p < .01, η2p = .43, 
reflecting faster reaction times on valid than invalid trials 
(608 ms, MSE = 14.73 vs. 660 ms, MSE = 15.58, respec-
tively). A main effect of Cue Duration, F(1, 40) = 29.79, p < 
.01, η2p = .43, revealed that reaction times were faster 
when cues were presented for longer (624 ms, MSE = 
14.51, vs. 645 ms, MSE = 14.60). No interactions involving 
Group approached significance, (all Fs < 2.5, largest η2p = 
.06), nor was there a main effect of Group (F < 1, η2p = 
.02). There was one significant interaction, Validity × Facial 
Expression, F(1,40) = 6.61, p < .01, η2p = .15. Table 2 shows 
the relevant means.
To interpret this interaction according to our hypoth-
eses about the effects of emotional compared with neu-
tral expressions, we used reaction times to neutral trials 
as a baseline against which to subtract the effects of emo-
tion cuing for valid and invalid trials separately, using the 
following equation:
Effect of emotional 
expressions on spatial 
orienting 
=
Neutral Cue [reaction time] – 
Emotional Cue [reaction time]
Thus a negative index indicates that emotion cues 
slowed reaction times, whereas a positive index indicates 
that emotion cues speeded reaction times, compared with 
neutral. Slowing on valid trials can therefore be inter-
preted as slower engagement to emotion, while speeding 
on invalid trials can be interpreted as faster disengage-
ment from emotion. Subsequent analyses were carried 
out on these index scores. Figure 2 illustrates these data. 
For completeness, hypothesis-driven follow-up t tests 
were conducted comparing each index score to zero (no 
effect of emotion). After correcting for multiple 
 by Jenny Yiend on October 26, 2015cpx.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
766 Yiend et al.
comparisons, two effects remained significant. Fear cues 
significantly slowed reaction times on valid trials, t(41) = 
4.47, p < .01, d = 0.69, and significantly speeded reaction 
times on invalid trials, t(41) = 2.77, p < .01, d = 0.43.
In the preceding analyses there were no significant 
group interactions, suggesting that the pattern of orient-
ing applied to GAD patients and healthy volunteers alike. 
However, given the purpose of the experiment and the 
previous literature, a further hypothesis-driven analysis 
was conducted as a stringent test of whether the pattern 
of findings held true in the patient sample alone. The 
main analysis was repeated on the patient sample only, 
namely a repeated measures ANOVA of design Cue 
Duration (200, 500 ms) × Facial Expression (anger, fear, 
happy, neutral) × Validity (invalid, valid). This revealed a 
significant Validity × Facial Expression interaction, F(3, 
60) = 2.98, p = .04, η2p = .13, as previously, with means 
following the same pattern as the main findings, reported 
earlier.
Central cueing task. Error trials totaled 1.8% of the 
data and outliers 2.1% (high outliers > 1,160 ms; low out-
liers < 100 ms).4 A mixed model ANOVA was conducted 
on mean reaction times to identify the target, with one 
between-subjects factor, Group (patient, control), and 
three within-subjects factors, Cue Duration (300, 700 ms), 
Facial Expression (fear, neutral), and Cue Congruency 
(central, congruent, incongruent). There was a main 
effect of Cue Congruency, F(2, 80) = 20.11, p < .01, η2p = 
.34, reflecting faster reaction times on congruent than 
central trials (556 ms, SE = 13.30 vs. 568 ms, SE = 13.70) 
and on central than incongruent trials (568 ms, SE = 13.70 
vs. 572 ms, SE = 13.94). Thus the general effect of spatial 
attentional cuing on this task was as expected. A main 
effect of Cue Duration, F(2, 80) = 18.54, p < .01, η2p = .32, 
revealed that reaction times were faster when cues were 
presented for longer (559 ms, SE = 13.85 vs. 572 ms, SE = 
13.45). No interactions involving Group approached sig-
nificance (all Fs < 1.5, largest η2p = .03), nor was there a 
main effect of Group (F < 0.5, η2p < .01). There was one 
significant interaction, Cue Duration × Facial Expression, 
F(1, 40) = 6.98, p = .01, η2p = .15. Table 2 shows the rel-
evant data. Follow-up pairwise comparisons showed that 
at cue durations of 700 ms (but not 300) participants 
were significantly slowed by fearful compared with neu-
tral cues, t(41) = 2.55, p = .02, d = 0.40.
Discussion
Despite patients and healthy volunteers being highly dif-
ferentiated in their levels of psychopathology, the two 
groups did not differ significantly in their attentional pro-
cessing of emotional expressions on either of the two 
tasks administered. Instead, on the peripheral cuing task 
both anxious patients and healthy volunteers showed 
relative speeding on invalid trials with emotional cues, 
especially when fear-related compared with neutral cues 
were used. As in Experiment 1, this unexpected finding 
suggested faster, not slower, disengagement of attention 
from emotional expressions, a pattern that was especially 
unexpected for the GAD group based on previous results 
in subclinical anxiety. In addition, reaction times on valid 
trials suggested slower, not faster, engagement of atten-
tion to emotional expressions, especially fear, which 
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Fig. 2. The effects of emotional expression cues on spatial attentional orienting in 
the peripheral cuing task. Positive values reflect a reaction time speeding effect, and 
negative values a reaction time slowing effect, of emotion compared with neutral cues. 
*Contrast with zero survives correction for multiple comparisons.
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again was particularly unexpected for the GAD group on 
the basis of previous nonclinical research. On both valid 
and invalid trials, fear cues were particularly effective at 
eliciting this pattern of spatial attentional avoidance, as 
illustrated in Figure 2. Of importance, there was no evi-
dence of a general slowing effect of emotion, which can 
compromise the interpretation of cuing data (see Yiend, 
2010, p. 29, for details).
On the second task, an emotional adaptation of an 
eye gaze cuing task, there was no evidence that spatial 
attentional orienting was influenced by the valence of 
the central cue. There was, as expected, a congruency or 
cue validity effect, but this did not interact with the emo-
tional expression of the facial cue or participant group. 
In addition, irrespective of how attention was directed, 
participants showed a general slowing when fearful 
compared with neutral information was presented at the 
longer duration (700 ms). These results are in marked 
contrast to our previous findings in subclinical anxiety 
where the facial expression of the cue did influence the 
allocation of attention and this enhancement was influ-
enced by the degree of self-reported trait anxiety. 
Specifically, fearful faces were more effective at eliciting 
a shift of attention to the gazed at location in individuals 
with high relative to low trait anxiety (Fox et al., 2007; 
Mathews et al., 2003). The absence of this pattern in the 
current sample of GAD patients further emphasizes the 
difficulty of generalizing from subclinical studies to clini-
cal populations.
General Discussion
Experiments 1 and 2 produced conceptually similar pat-
terns of results. Experiment 1 found that individuals 
meeting diagnostic criteria for GAD showed faster disen-
gagement from angry than from neutral facial expres-
sions, a pattern that was quite different from that found 
in a group of people who did not meet diagnostic criteria 
for GAD but who were matched with the clinical group 
on the level of self-reported trait anxiety. Experiment 2 
showed spatial attentional orienting effects indicating 
avoidance of fearful facial cues that, once again, did not 
differ between GAD and healthy volunteers. Both groups 
showed avoidance of fearful expressions, being faster to 
disengage from, and slower to engage to, fearful com-
pared with neutral or happy facial cues. Moreover, this 
pattern held up in a stringent hypothesis-driven test of 
the GAD patient sample alone. Using a gaze cueing task, 
the pattern of results found for our GAD sample was, 
once again, different from that previously found with the 
same task in people with subclinical levels of high trait 
anxiety (Fox et al., 2007; Mathews et al., 2003). The gen-
eral implication of these findings, across the two experi-
ments, is that previously reported anxiety-specific effects 
of impaired disengagement from, and speeded engage-
ment toward, threatening information in subclinical sam-
ples may not be as relevant for clinical populations as has 
been widely assumed.
These results have important implications for experi-
mental psychopathology. It is widely assumed that stud-
ies in subclinical analogue samples can be generalized to 
the corresponding clinical disorder, and this has particu-
larly been the case for the phenomenon of impaired dis-
engagement of attention in anxiety. However, there are 
insufficient published studies in clinical anxiety groups to 
validate this assumption. The present data with two sam-
ples of GAD patients underline the need for caution in 
generalizing previous findings from subclinical samples. 
Rather than delayed disengagement and faster engage-
ment with fear-relevant stimuli as expected, we found 
faster disengagement and slower engagement with threat, 
a pattern indicative of attentional avoidance of threat-
relevant material. Attentional avoidance of relatively mild 
levels of threat-relevant material has been reported else-
where (Mogg et al., 2000; Wilson & MacLeod, 2003) and 
is integral to two current models of attentional orienting 
toward fear-relevant stimuli (Mathews & Mackintosh, 
1998; Mogg & Bradley, 1998). It is proposed that this 
avoidance is an evolutionarily adaptive response allow-
ing current goals to be pursued, unimpeded by relatively 
minor and insignificant environmental challenges. Of 
importance, however, the absence of this attentional 
avoidance of mild threat is considered to be an important 
cognitive component associated with high levels of trait 
anxiety (e.g., Fox et al., 2001; Yiend & Mathews, 2001). 
Although the present data are broadly consistent with 
this suggestion, the observation of this same pattern of 
avoidance in the clinical anxiety groups runs counter to 
expectations. Taken together, these studies could be 
taken to indicate that impaired disengagement from 
threatening information is a specific attentional marker of 
vulnerable, subclinical samples, but does not extend to, 
or may even be reversed in, clinical anxiety.
The implications of the findings we report here are 
especially pertinent for translational research. For exam-
ple, new experimentally based treatments are being 
developed for various disorders based on manipulations 
of cognitive biases (e.g., Amir et al., 2009; Hayes, Hirsch, 
& Mathews, 2010; Lester et  al., 2011; Yiend, Savulich, 
Coughtrey, & Shafran, 2011). Researchers applying these 
manipulations to clinical anxiety have generally assumed 
that it is necessary to correct the impaired disengagement 
of attention from threat, given the findings in subclinical 
samples. However, the pattern of data we report suggests 
that this assumption may not be warranted. The present 
data challenge this assumption and suggest that general-
izing conclusions from subclinical to clinical anxiety may 
be premature. A more nuanced understanding of the 
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pattern of spatial orienting to threat across clinical and 
subclinical anxiety may be required. Certainly, further 
work on the underlying mechanisms of spatial attention 
processing in GAD is now warranted.
As with all research, the studies reported here suffer 
from a number of limitations. For instance, our sample 
sizes were relatively small and may have been insuffi-
cient to detect between-group differences in the orient-
ing of spatial attention. In the first experiment with only 
14 participants per group, power to detect small effects 
was low. However the second experiment was specifi-
cally powered to detect the necessary interaction effect, 
assuming a small effect size (see methods section for 
power analyses). Moreover, the fact that both experi-
ments found a broadly similar pattern of rapid disengage-
ment, or avoidance, of threat-relevant cues that was 
opposite to that found in subclinical samples mitigates 
against issues of power being a parsimonious explana-
tion of our findings. In addition, demonstration of the 
expected general-emotion-related spatial orienting effects 
found in Experiment 2 suggests that those tasks were 
appropriately sensitive, but that the pattern of attentional 
processing on these tasks previously observed in sub-
clinical anxiety (Fox et al., 2001; Fox et al., 2007; Mathews 
et al., 2003) was not observed in a GAD sample.
A more nuanced possibility, and one which the pres-
ent data cannot speak to, is that attentional orienting 
effects (engagement and disengagement) may operate 
over different timescales in clinical and subclinical sam-
ples. The results of Ellenbogen and Schwartzman (2009) 
raise this possibility. They tested 36 patients with a vari-
ety of anxiety disorders (11 had GAD as a primary diag-
nosis) and reported that they were fast to disengage from 
supraliminal threatening pictures (similar to the effects 
seen in the present data) and that impaired disengage-
ment was limited to pictures presented subliminally. They 
concluded that this pattern of results reflected early vigi-
lance followed by effortful avoidance. However, as their 
investigation included other conditions and clinical 
groups, the impact of their findings for GAD is difficult to 
assess. Nevertheless, our finding of attentional avoidance 
in a GAD sample with supraliminal stimuli is consistent 
with this notion. It is possible that we would have found 
the anticipated pattern of enhanced engagement and 
impaired disengagement had we also examined sublimi-
nal effects.
Arguably, the most important limitation of the present 
research concerns the nature of the stimuli used to test 
for attentional effects. Early findings, reviewed by 
Mathews and MacLeod (1994, p. 36), indicated that atten-
tional effects may depend critically on relevance of the 
stimuli to the individual participant’s current emotional 
concerns. For example, socially phobic patients are par-
ticularly likely to attend to socially threatening words, 
whereas panic disorder patients are more likely to attend 
to physically threatening words. Even in nonanxious 
groups, words matching current emotional concerns are 
differentially attended, whether negative or positive in 
valence (Reimann & McNally, 1995). Facial stimuli may 
not therefore have tapped the most appropriate content 
for GAD, because the major symptom, worry, is thought 
to be primarily verbal. Indeed the original finding of 
attentional bias in GAD (MacLeod et al., 1986) used word 
stimuli, as have some successful GAD attentional training 
studies (Amir et al., 2009). Against this, some studies have 
used facial expressions as stimuli and found attentional 
differences between GAD and healthy participants 
(Ashwin et al., 2012; Bradley et al., 1999; Mogg, Millar, & 
Bradley, 2000; Waters, Mogg, Bradley, & Pine, 2008). This 
literature is somewhat difficult to interpret, however, as 
the studies are few and they use different measures of 
attention (e.g., eye movements; Mogg et al., 2000) or dif-
ferent samples (e.g., children; Waters et al., 2008). Another 
possible explanation for the mixed pattern of findings is 
that some GAD patients worry about social threats, and 
therefore biased attention to threat-related facial expres-
sions would be a reasonable expectation. However, for 
many GAD patients, whose worries relate to other dimen-
sions, these stimuli would not necessarily trigger atten-
tional bias. It seems clear that more information is 
required, not only on attentional mechanisms in GAD, 
but also on exactly what type of stimuli are associated 
with triggering these mechanisms.
In light of the findings we present here, it is useful to 
consider how the field of attentional bias in GAD should 
seek to move forward to decisively resolve the questions 
raised by our data. In our view, the previously discussed 
link between the nature of the stimuli presented and the 
emotional concerns of the individual is the issue most in 
need of being addressed in future studies. We therefore 
advocate more precise specification of both the form and 
content of emotional cues that best match emotional con-
cerns in clinical groups such as GAD, as a necessary pre-
cursor to revisiting the questions raised in the present 
experiments, such as the role of attentional engagement 
and disengagement, as well as of possible differences in 
this respect between clinical and high trait anxious 
groups.
The first necessary experimental step therefore 
involves establishing the type of stimuli that best evoke 
the primary emotional concerns of the target group (e.g., 
GAD patients), and determining how these stimuli differ 
from those in nonclinical groups, including those with 
high trait anxiety. This would determine whether spe-
cific concerns (e.g., about social disapproval) are less 
frequent or central in GAD patients than in high trait 
anxious groups, as discussed earlier. A related question 
concerns the way in which emotional concerns are 
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typically represented: For example, in patients with 
social phobias, threats are typically represented in the 
form of images of oneself performing poorly in social 
situations, whereas in GAD patients, future threats are 
more often represented in quasi-verbal form (Hirsch, 
Hayes, Mathews, Perman, & Borkovec, 2012).
The second step would be to use this information to 
revisit the questions addressed in the current experiments: 
namely, to test whether stimuli known to evoke relevant 
emotional concerns in clinical groups elicit differential 
attentional engagement, slowed disengagement, or both, 
in comparison with nonclinical high trait anxiety and 
healthy volunteer groups. An ideal study would include 
analysis of a wide time scale of stimulus processing. Given 
the results of Ellenbogen and Schwartzman (2009), it 
would be important to assess attentional mechanisms with 
very fast (subliminal) presentation times up to much lon-
ger presentation times. The ideal study would be powered, 
a priori, to detect small effects, using either these or other 
similar relevant data. The sample should compare GAD 
patients with sociodemographically matched healthy vol-
unteers and with a subclinical participant group also 
matched to patients for their levels of trait anxiety and 
depression. A study of this design would be well placed to 
provide essential new empirical data to guide future devel-
opments, not only in the field of attentional processing in 
anxiety per se, but also in the rapidly growing field con-
cerned with the translational applications of this research.
Perhaps it will transpire that—given stimuli similarly 
evocative of individual emotional concerns—attentional 
(and other) effects are actually quite similar across clinical 
and subclinical anxiety, even if the form or content of the 
evocative stimuli differ. This finding would suggest that 
rather than the nature of attentional responding per se, it 
may be the type, intensity, or range of emotional concerns 
that is particularly characteristic of clinical conditions. 
Alternatively, it may be that the underlying pattern and 
direction of attentional processing does indeed differ 
across groups. Thus it may be the case that cues that are 
related to central emotional concerns do indeed elicit dif-
ferent degrees (or directions) of attentional engagement, 
or disengagement, in clinical than in comparison subclini-
cal groups. Answering these questions is likely to be dif-
ficult, but addressing them is essential to throw light on 
the cognitive mechanisms that play a causal role in emo-
tional disorders, as well as having obvious implications 
for identifying profitable targets for treatment.
In summary the two studies presented here suggest 
GAD patients may show a pattern of attentional biases 
opposite to that observed using similar methods in sub-
clinical samples to date. Specifically, instead of impaired 
disengagement from threatening expressions, the data 
suggest selective attentional avoidance of threat-related 
facial expressions in GAD. These results pose a challenge 
to assumptions made to date about the generic nature of 
attentional biases in GAD, indicating that it may be pre-
mature to generalize from existing subclinical studies of 
attentional biases. Further work is undoubtedly needed 
to resolve the questions the present studies raise, and we 
have attempted to make some concrete suggestions for 
how best the field can be further advanced. This is par-
ticularly important in the context of developing cognitive 
manipulations (Hertel & Mathews, 2011) designed to 
modify specific biases that may be used in future treat-
ments or treatment adjuncts. It will be important to have 
a deeper understanding of the nature and type of atten-
tional biases that occur in GAD before we can be confi-
dent that reducing specific biases is likely to have clinical 
benefits. Our data point to a need for further basic 
research into patterns of attentional orienting in clinical 
anxiety.
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Notes
1. Attention also may be oriented to particular stimulus dimen-
sions that co-occur in the same spatial location at the same time 
(e.g., to the color or content of a word).
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2. Analysis without the use of reaction time outlier cutoffs ren-
ders results uninterpretable. This is due to the resulting inclu-
sion of (a) anticipatory responses and (b) responses involving 
temporary lapses of attention or inattention. This practice is 
in line with methodological guidelines given in Yiend and 
Mathews (2004).
3. See Note 2.
4. See Note 2.
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